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CIVIL RIGHTS-RIGHTS PROTECTED AND
DISCRIMINATION PROHIBITED: LIVING IN SIN IN NORTH
DAKOTA? NOT UNDER MY LEASE
North Dakota Fair Housing Council, Inc. v. Peterson,
2001 ND 81, 625 N.W.2d 551 (2001)
I. FACTS
In March 1999, Robert Kippen and Patricia DePoe, an engaged but
unmarried couple, unsuccessfully attempted to rent a duplex from David
and Mary Peterson.' The couple was denied housing by the Petersons
because they were unlawfully seeking to cohabit according to the North
Dakota unlawful cohabitation statute.2 The couple married a month after
the Petersons refused to rent them the duplex, and at this time, the Kippens
joined with the North Dakota Fair Housing Council (NDFHC).3 The
NDFHC and the Kippens filed a claim against the Petersons alleging
housing discrimination in violation of the North Dakota Human Rights Act,
which prohibited a landlord from discriminating against a prospective
tenant on the basis of marital status.4
The issue addressed in North Dakota Fair Housing Council, Inc. v.
Peterson5 was whether it was contrary to the discriminatory housing prac-
tices provision of the North Dakota Human Rights Act to refuse to rent to
an unmarried couple because they were seeking to cohabit.6 The crucial
determination was whether the term "status with respect to marriage," as it
appeared in the North Dakota Human Rights Act, would be extended to
1. N.D. Fair Hous. Council, Inc. v. Peterson, 2001 ND 81, 1 2,625 N.W.2d 551, 553.
2. Id.; see generally N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-20-10 (1997) (prohibiting unmarried cohabita-
tion).
3. Peterson, T 1, 625 N.W.2d at 553. The North Dakota Fair Housing Council (NDFHC) is
a non-profit organization that was founded in 1995. North Dakota Fair Housing Council, About
Our Organization, available at http://ndfhc.fairhousing.com (last visited September 16, 2002).
The NDFHC seeks to eliminate "housing discrimination through community education;
encouragement of public involvement; assistance to those experiencing housing discrimination;
and support of individuals and organizations seeking equal opportunity in housing." Id.
4. Peterson, T 2, 625 N.W.2d at 554. The North Dakota Human Rights Act, as it appeared
when the Kippens were refused housing, was codified at North Dakota Century Code chapter 14-
02.4. Id. The pertinent part of the Act made it a discriminatory practice for a person who owned
housing properties to discriminate against people based on "race, color, religion, sex, national
origin, age, physical or mental disability, or status with respect to marriage or public assistance."
N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.4-12 (repealed 1999).
5. 2001 ND 81, 625 N.W.2d 551.
6. Peterson, 6, 625 N.W.2d at 554.
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include unmarried cohabitation. 7 If the court considered unmarried cohabi-
tation a form of marital status, the Petersons would have been guilty of
marital status discrimination because they refused to rent to the Kippens on
the basis that they were unmarried and seeking to cohabit. 8 However, if the
court considered cohabitation as something other than a form of marital
status, the Petersons' refusal to rent to the Kippens would have been per-
missible because the applicable law only punished landlords who refused to
rent housing on the basis of status.9 The apparent conflict between the
unlawful cohabitation statute, prohibiting cohabitation between unmarried
persons, and the North Dakota Human Rights Act, prohibiting housing dis-
crimination on the basis of marital status, was an issue of first impression in
North Dakota. 10
The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Peter-
sons." The court concluded that the Petersons were permitted to refuse
housing accommodations to the Kippens because North Dakota public
policy did not approve of unmarried cohabitation and because it did not
interpret unmarried cohabitation as being marital status.12 The Kippens
appealed the district court's decision, alleging that the court misinterpreted
North Dakota law.13 The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the deci-
sion of the district court and held that refusing to rent housing to an unmar-
ried couple seeking to cohabit did not violate the North Dakota Human
Rights Act. 14
7. Id. 1 27, 625 N.W.2d at 560 (stating that the term "status with respect to marriage" was
not defined in the North Dakota Human Rights Act).
8. Id. 29. The North Dakota Human Rights Act defined a landlord's refusal to rent to a
person on the basis of marital status as a discriminatory housing practice. N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-
02.4-12 (repealed 1999).
9. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.4-12 (repealed 1999) (proscribing discrimination on the
basis of marital status).
10. Peterson, 14, 625 N.W.2d at 555. In 1990, North Dakota Attorney General Nicholas J.
Spaeth issued a formal report on the apparent conflict between the unlawful cohabitation statute
and the North Dakota Human Rights Act provision. See 1990 N.D. Op. Att'y Gen. No. 12, 43.
He concluded that it was not a discriminatory practice under the North Dakota Human Rights Act
to discriminate against two unmarried persons seeking to cohabit. Id. at 45. The issue had also
been raised previously to a United States district court in 1999. See generally Fair Hous. Council,
Inc. v. Haider, No. A1-98-77, 1999 WL 33283355 (D.N.D. Mar. 9, 1999).
11. Peterson, 9 3, 625 N.W.2d at 554. The NDFHC was dismissed from the action by the
District Court of Cass County because it lacked standing to sue. Id. The court did not consider it
an "aggrieved party" under the North Dakota Human Rights Act. Id. The NDFHC filed an




14. Id. T 49, 625 N.W.2d at 563.
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II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. THE HISTORY OF UNLAWFUL COHABITATION LAWS IN THE
UNITED STATES
Unlawful cohabitation became a crime in the United States with the
enactment of the Edmunds Act in 1882.15 The Edmunds Act was a reflec-
tion of the anti-polygamy sentiment expressed by Congress and was direct-
ed toward Utah and the Mormon Church.16 The Edmunds Act disen-
franchised Mormons, made them ineligible for public office and jury duty,
and made "unlawful cohabitation" a criminal act. 17 The Act also imposed
civil penalties on polygamists, which consisted of canceling their rights to
vote, 18 hold public office,19 and serve on juries. 20
Under the Edmunds Act, prosecution of polygamists was facilitated
through the creation of a new offense called unlawful cohabitation.2 1
According to the Act, a male committed the crime of unlawful cohabitation
when he cohabited with more than one woman. 22
In 1885, in the District Court of the Third Judicial District in the
Territory of Utah, Angus Cannon was found guilty of living with more than
one woman and was charged with the crime of unlawful cohabitation.2 3
The evidence presented to the district court indicated that Cannon lived in a
residence with two women and their children; that each woman and her
children occupied a specific portion of the house; that Cannon spent time
interacting with each woman and her children; and that he was the father to
15. Edmunds Act, ch. 47, § 8, 22 Stat. 30, 31 (1882) (codified at 48 U.S.C. § 1461 (1978)),
repealed by Pub. L. No. 98-213, § 16(1), 97 Stat. 1462, 1463 (1983).
16. Keith E. Sealing, Polygamists Out of the Closet: Statutory and State Constitutional Pro-
hibitions Against Polygamy are Unconstitutional Under the Free Exercise Clause, 17 GA. ST. U.
L. REv. 691,703-04 (2001).
17. See Soc'y of Separationists, Inc. v. Whitehead, 870 P.2d 916, 926 (Utah 1993).
18. Edmunds Act, ch. 47, § 8, 22 Stat. 30, 31-32.
19. Id.
20. Id. § 5, 22 Stat. 31; see also Whitehead, 870 P.2d at 926 (stating "[a]s a result of the Ed-
munds Act, many Mormons were not permitted to vote or serve on juries, and polygamists faced
criminal indictments in the federal courts").
21. See Edmunds Act, ch. 47, §§ 3-5, 22 Stat. 31. The cohabitation crime was created to
charge polygamists because a cohabitation conviction required less evidence than what a prose-
cutor needed to convict a polygamist without proving an illegal marriage. See Utah History to Go,
The History of Polygamy, available at http://www.utahhistorytogo.org/historyofpolygamy.html
(last visited May 22, 2002). Cohabitation was defined broadly because it criminalized the act of
"living with more than one woman." Edmunds Act, ch. 47, § 5, 22 Stat. 31. With the addition of
the cohabitation offense, a prosecutor could charge a person with polygamy and cohabitation at
the same time. Id. § 4.
22. Edmunds Act, ch. 47, § 3, 22 Stat. 31.
23. See Cannon v. United States, 116 U.S. 55, 59 (1885).
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some of the children.24 The jury was instructed to find Cannon guilty of
cohabitation if it determined beyond a reasonable doubt that he lived in the
same house with both women.2 5 The court further instructed that it was not
necessary for the jury to find that Cannon slept in the same bed with either
of the women or that he had sexual intercourse with them.26 The jury found
Cannon guilty of unlawful cohabitation based on the sole fact that he was
living in the same house with both women. 27
Cannon appealed the decision to the United States Supreme Court,
arguing that the lower court erred in its instructions to the jury regarding the
term "cohabit."28 He argued that the term "cohabit" necessarily includes
the notion of having sexual intercourse.29 The Court, however, rejected his
interpretation and subsequently affirmed the jury instructions given by the
lower court.30 In affirming Cannon's conviction, the Court held that a man
has committed the crime of unlawful cohabitation when he lived in a house
with more than one woman and that proof of sexual intercourse or evidence
of sleeping in the same bed with each woman was not necessary. 3 1
B. UNLAWFUL COHABITATION IN NORTH DAKOTA
Unlawful cohabitation has been a criminal offense in North Dakota
since the mid-nineteenth century. 32 Toward the end of the nineteenth cen-
tury, statutory prohibition on unlawful cohabitation read as follows:
Every person who lives openly and notoriously and cohabits as
husband and wife with a person of the opposite sex without being
married to such person is guilty of a misdemeanor and upon con-
viction thereof is punishable by imprisonment in the county jail for
not less than thirty days and not exceeding one year, or by a fine of
not less than one hundred and not exceeding five hundred
dollars.33
24. Id. at 60-62.
25. Id. at 66.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 59-60.
28. Id. at 67.
29. Id. at 70.
30. Id. at 71.
31. Id. at 71, 79.
32. LAWS OF DAKOTA, ch. 10, § 4 (1863) (Criminal Code).
33. REVISED CODE OF NORTH DAKOTA, ch. 28, § 7171 (1895).
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The terms of the unlawful cohabitation statute were not defined, however,
until 1938. 34
In 1938, the North Dakota Supreme Court decided the seminal case of
State v. Hoffman,35 in which the language of the unlawful cohabitation
statute was interpreted and defined.36 The term "openly" was defined as
"living together the same as a husband and wife would live together ... un-
disguised and unconcealed, as opposed to hidden and secret." 37 "Having
occasional illicit intercourse, without publicly or notoriously living
together, [was] not sufficient to constitute the offense of living in a state of
open and notorious adultery" because to satisfy the open and notorious
element of the offense, the parties must have exhibited to the community a
relationship that suggested a conjugal relation existed between them. 38
The Hoffman court then defined the term "notoriously" as "generally
known or acknowledged." 39 This meant it was common knowledge in the
community that the two people were cohabiting.40 In addition, the court
stated the couple must have lived and acted in such a way that people who
noticed them would be justified in concluding that they were living in the
same house as husband and wife.4'
Finally, the Hoffman court interpreted the term "cohabits as husband
and wife" as a requirement that the two people were having intercourse with
each other the same way they would if they were married.42 The court
reasoned that the unmarried couple did not have to act any more "openly"
or "notoriously" than any married couple would; however, the quality of
living of the unmarried couple must have been comparable to that of a
married couple. 43 Since the Hoffman court defined the terms of unlawful
cohabitation in 1938, there were few modifications to the semantics of the
statute or the penalties associated with the crime until an interim committee
created the present unlawful cohabitation law in 1971.44
34. See State v. Hoffman, 282 N.W. 407, 409 (N.D. 1938) (defining the terms "openly,"
"notoriously," and "cohabits as husband and wife").
35. 282 N.W. 407 (N.D. 1938).
36. Hoffman, 282 N.W. at 409.
37. Id. (citing Commonwealth v. Wardell, 128 Mass. 52, 53 (Mass. 1880)).
38. Bums v. State, 182 P. 738, 738 (Okla. Crim. App. 1919).
39. Hoffman, 282 N.W. at 409 (citing McCorkendale v. McCorkendale, 111 Iowa 314, 316
(Iowa 1900)).
40. Id. (citing NORTH DAKOTA COMPILED LAWS, ch. 30, § 9581 (1913)).
41. Id. (citing Copeland v. State, 133 P. 258, 258 (Okla. Crim. App. 1913)).
42. Id.
43. Id. (citing Leonard v. State, 153 S.W. 590, 591 (Ark. 1913)).
44. See 2 NORTH DAKOTA LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL INTERIM MINUTES AND BACKGROUND
MEMOS, CLASSIFICATION OF CRIMINAL OFFENSE STUDY-BACKGROUND MEMORANDUM 1
(1999-2001) (stating "[d]uring the 1971-72 interim, that the Judiciary 'B' Committee, pursuant to
2002]
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An interim committee was commissioned by the legislature in 1971 to
revise the substantive criminal laws in North Dakota.45 The committee pro-
vided a draft of a new criminal code and considered recommending the
repeal of the unlawful cohabitation statute to the legislature.46 Three
alternative provisions were proposed for the sexual offenses chapter of the
North Dakota Criminal Code.47 The crime of unlawful cohabitation
appeared in each of the alternatives.4 8 The same language on cohabitation
was found in each of the alternatives, except for a proposal that the offense
be classified as a class A misdemeanor as opposed to a class B mis-
demeanor.4 9 The legislature chose the lesser penalty, and unlawful cohabi-
tation was classified as a class B misdemeanor in the 1973 North Dakota
Criminal Code.50 The unlawful cohabitation statute in North Dakota, as
found in section 12.1-20-10 of the North Dakota Century Code, currently
reads as follows: "A person is guilty of a Class B misdemeanor if he or she
lives openly and notoriously with a person of the opposite sex as a married
couple without being married to the other person."51
House Concurrent Resolution No. 3050, was assigned to review and revise the substantive
criminal statutes of North Dakota").
45. Id.
46. N.D. Fair Hous. Council v. Peterson, 2001 ND 81, 11,625 N.W.2d 551, 555.
47. Id. 9 12, 625 N.W.2d at 556. The Forty-Third Legislative Assembly of North Dakota
considered three alternative provisions for the unlawful cohabitation statute; under alternative one,
a person would have been guilty of a class B misdemeanor if he or she lived openly and
notoriously with a person of the opposite sex as a married couple without being married to the
other person. S.B. 2047, 1973 Leg., 43d Sess. 4 (N.D. 1973). The text of the other two proposed
alternatives was identical, however, proposed changes in other sections of the Criminal Code
resulted in the assignment of different section numbers: under alternatives two and three, a person
would have been guilty of a class B misdemeanor if he or she lived openly and notoriously with a
person of the opposite sex as a married couple without being married to the other person. S.B.
2048, 1973 Leg., 43d Sess. (N.D. 1973); S.B. 2049, 1973 Leg., 43d Sess. (N.D. 1973) (codified at
N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-20-10 (1997)).
48. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
49. See North Dakota Criminal Code Hornbook, 50 N.D. L. REV. 639, 646 (1974). A class
A misdemeanor referred to an offense with a punishment of a maximum of one year
imprisonment, a one thousand dollar fine, or both. Id. A class B misdemeanor differed from a
class A misdemeanor because it resulted in a lesser penalty of a maximum of thirty days
imprisonment, a fine of five hundred dollars, or both. Id.
50. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-20-10 (1997). This represented a relatively small change in
the interpretation of the unlawful cohabitation statute because the crime was defined as a
misdemeanor by section 9581 of the Compiled Laws when the North Dakota Supreme Court
decided Hoffrnan. State v. Hoffman, 282 N.W. 407, 409 (N.D. 1938).
51. N.D. CENT. CODE§ 12.1-20-10.
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C. ANTI-DISCRIMINATION LAWS IN HOUSING
Anti-discrimination provisions in both state52 and federal legislation53
exist to prohibit discrimination in housing. Although the groups of people
offered protection under the federal law run the gamut, no specific pro-
hibition exists to prohibit discrimination against unmarried couples in the
sale or rental of housing. 54 No express provisions have been included to
prohibit discrimination against unmarried couples in fair housing provisions
regulated under state law.
55
1. Federal Statutory Protection Against Housing Discrimination
Congress enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1866 to provide all United
States citizens with the same rights to inherit, purchase, lease, and convey
property as the white man enjoyed. 56 On paper, this law afforded all citi-
zens equal property rights; however, it did not address discrimination in
52. E.g., CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 12980-12988 (West 1992 & Supp. 2002); IOWA CODE §§
216.8 to 216.8A (2000); MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 37.2501-37.2507 (2001); MINN. STAT. § 363.03
(1991 & Supp. 2002); N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 296 (McKinney 2001); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 14-02.4-
01 to -46 (Supp. 2001); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 20-13-20 (Michie 1995); WIS. STAT. § 106.50
(Supp. 2001).
53. General Program of Assisted Housing, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1437-1437z-7 (2000).
54. See Maureen E. Markey, The Price of Landlord's "Free" Exercise of Religion: Tenant's
Right to Discrimination-Free Housing, 22 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 699, 744 (1995) (stating that as of
1995, the Federal Fair Housing Act did not include marital status in its enumerated categories and
did not specifically prohibit discrimination against unmarried couples in the sale or rental of
housing). As of 2001, unmarried couples were still not included within the enumerated categories
of people protected against discrimination in housing. See 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (2000) (prohibiting
discrimination in housing on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national
origin).
55. See Matthew J. Smith, The Wages of Living in Sin: Discrimination in Housing Against
Unmarried Couples, 25 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1055, 1056 (1992) (stating none of the state laws
prohibiting discrimination in housing specify non-marital cohabitation as an impermissible basis
for a landlord to discriminate).
56. Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27, 27 (1866) (current version at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1981-1982 (2000)). Section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 stated:
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of
America in Congress assembled, That all persons born in the United States and not
subject to any foreign power, excluding Indians not taxed, are hereby declared to be
citizens of the United States; and such citizens, of every race and color, without regard
to any previous condition of slavery or involuntary servitude, except as punishment for
a crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall have the same right, in
every State and Territory in the United States, to make and enforce contracts, to sue,
be parties, and give evidence, to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold and convey real and
personal property, and to full and equal benefit of laws and proceedings for the
security of person and property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to
like punishment, pains, and penalties, and to none other, any law, statute, ordinance,
regulation, or custom to the contrary notwithstanding.
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housing. 57 A broad-based anti-discrimination law was not available to
vindicate housing rights until the enactment of the 1968 Civil Rights Act,
which codified the Federal Fair Housing Act. 58 Congress enacted Title VIII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1968 (the Federal Fair Housing Act) to ensure,
within constitutional limitations, the availability of fair housing throughout
the country. 59 Together, the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and the Federal Fair
Housing Act included within the Civil Rights Act of 1968 provided for the
right of all United States citizens to enjoy property and housing rights free
from discrimination, a right that is backed by federal enforcement.
60
2. Federal Anti-Discrimination Provisions for the Protection of
Unmarried Couples
There is no specific protection against marital status discrimination
anywhere in the Federal Fair Housing Act; however, a minority of courts
has interpreted other federal laws as offering protection to unmarried
cohabiting couples.6 1 The reason the anti-discrimination provisions of the
Federal Fair Housing Act have rarely been extended to unmarried couples is
two-fold. First, marital status discrimination has not been interpreted to fall
within the term "familial status," which is a prohibited basis for landlord
57. See id.
58. See id. The Civil Rights Act of 1866 prohibited racial discrimination in the sale or rental
of property. Id. The Federal Fair Housing Act (Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968)
furthered the scope of earlier anti-discrimination laws by prohibiting discrimination in housing
based on race, national origin, color, and religion. See Title VIII of Act of April 11, 1968, P.L.
90-284, 82 Stat. 81 (current version at 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619 (2000)). The Fair Housing Act
prohibited discrimination in housing because of race or color, national origin, religion, sex,
familial status (including children under the age of eighteen living with their parents, pregnant
women, and persons who have custody of children under the age of eighteen), and handicap or
disability. 42 U.S.C. § 3604. Later amendments were made to the Fair Housing Act in 1974 and
1988 to prohibit discrimination in housing based on sex and on handicap or familial status
respectively. Id.
59. See Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3601 (declaring that "it is the policy of the United
States to provide, within constitutional limitations, for fair housing throughout the United States").
Like the 1866 Civil Rights Act, the Federal Fair Housing Act was an exercise of congressional
power under the Thirteenth Amendment. United States v. Hunter, 459 F.2d 205, 214 (4th Cir.
1972); see also U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 2 (giving Congress the power to use legislative
enforcement).
60. Williams v. Matthews Co., 499 F.2d 819, 825 (8th Cir. 1974).
61. See Hann v. Hous. Auth. for the City of Easton, 709 F. Supp. 605, 610 (E.D. Pa. 1989)
(reasoning that rejecting a couple's application for a low-income housing program because the
couple was not married was a violation of the 1937 Federal Fair Housing Act); see also Atkisson
v. Kern County Hous. Auth., 130 Cal. Rptr. 375, 379-82 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976) (holding that the
public housing authority was not allowed to evict a tenant because she was cohabiting with an
adult male because the agency's policy of evicting a tenant solely because he or she was found to
be cohabiting with a person who was not related by blood or marriage was in violation of a
Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) provision, which stated that "a local
authority shall not establish policies which automatically deny admission or continued occupancy
to a particular class").
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discrimination. 62 Second, legislative history of the Fair Housing Amend-
ments Act indicates that the term "familial status" as used in the Federal
Fair Housing Act was never meant to include "marital status." 63
Federal public housing has been one area where federal law has been
extended to protect unmarried couples against marital status discrimi-
nation. 64 In Hann v. Housing Authority of the City of Easton,65 Cindy Hann
and her common-law husband, James Webster, were an unmarried couple
living with their children in an apartment complex when they were given a
notice of eviction. 66 The Easton Housing Authority offered vouchers for
rent subsidies to eligible applicants in an effort to assist those tenants who
would be affected by the eviction.67 Hann and Webster applied for assis-
tance, but the Housing Authority denied their request because it did not
accept common-law relationships and their living arrangement did not fit
within the agency's interpretation of "family." 68 Only people related by
blood, marriage, or adoption fell within the definition of "family" used by
the agency to determine eligibility for assistance. 69 The District Court for
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania rejected the narrow use of the term
"family" and instructed the Housing Authority to make individual
determinations about whether applicants constituted a family unit.70
The Pennsylvania court held that the Easton Housing Authority could
not deny an unmarried couple eligibility for federally subsidized low-
income housing programs on the basis that the couple was unmarried and
cohabiting. 7' The court further held that denying Hann and Webster's
62. See 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (stating the Federal Fair Housing Act prohibits discrimination on
the basis of family status).
Familial status means one or more individuals (who have not attained the age of 18
years) being domiciled with-
(1) a parent or another person having legal custody of such individual or individuals;
or
(2) the designee of such parent or other person having such custody, with the written
permission of such parent or other person.
42 U.S.C. § 3602(k); see also Markey, supra note 54, at 744 (stating that "the Federal Fair
Housing Act has not included marital status in its enumerated categories and has not specifically
prohibited discrimination against unmarried couples in the sale or rental of housing").
63. See H.R. Rep. No. 100-711, at 23, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2173, 2184 (stating
that the committee did not intend the term "familial status" to include marital status).
64. See Hann, 709 F. Supp. at 610 (holding that categorically denying unmarried couples
eligibility for low-income housing programs violated the United States Housing Act of 1937).
65. 709 F. Supp. 605 (E.D. Pa. 1989).




70. Id. at 610.
71. Id.
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application violated the United States Housing Act of 1937, which was
enacted for the purpose of providing low-income families with financial aid
to assist them in finding housing. 72 The court concluded that according to
federal regulations codified in the United States Housing Act of 1937,
unmarried cohabitants were entitled to "family status," thereby protecting
them from housing discrimination.7 3
The second area where federal courts have extended protection of anti-
discrimination provisions to unmarried couples has been in credit transac-
tions involving housing accommodations. 7 4 For example, in Markham v.
Colonial Mortgage Service Co.,75 an engaged couple jointly applied for a
mortgage loan, but their loan application was denied because they were not
married.76 The couple submitted the loan application again for reconsidera-
tion, but once again their application was denied because their separate
incomes did not qualify for a loan.77 The couple then sued and alleged that
the denial of their mortgage application violated the Equal Credit Op-
portunity Act (ECOA), which specifically prohibited a creditor from
discriminating against a credit applicant on the basis of marital status.
78
The District Court for the District of Columbia held that under the
ECOA, savings and loan associations must aggregate the incomes of un-
married couples applying for a mortgage, thereby treating them like a
married couple instead of separate individuals. 79 The court reasoned that by
refusing to aggregate the engaged couple's incomes, the savings and loan
association treated their application differently than it would have if the
couple had been married. 80 The court, therefore, found that the savings and
loan association had committed marital status discrimination, which was
prohibited by the ECOA.81
Unmarried couples are not protected from marital status discrimination
under the Federal Fair Housing Act; therefore, an unmarried couple who
has been refused housing on the basis of being unmarried must consult state
72. Id.; see also 42 U.S.C. §§ 1437-1437u (amended 1998). The 1937 Housing Act was
passed by Congress to provide sanitary, decent, and safe rental housing for eligible low-income
families. Hann, 709 F. Supp. at 608.
73. Hann, 709 F. Supp. at 608.
74. See Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1691-1691e (2000) (prohibiting dis-
crimination against unmarried couples in credit transactions for financing of housing accommo-
dations).
75. 605 F.2d 566 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
76. Markham, 605 F.2d at 568.
77. Id.
78. Id.; see also 15 U.S.C. § 1691 (2000).
79. Markham, 605 F. Supp. at 570.
80. Id. at 569.
81. Id.
[VOL. 78:539
2002] CASE COMMENT 549
laws to determine whether a remedy exists for such discrimination. 82 Al-
though many states have enacted laws prohibiting marital status discrimi-
nation, very few state courts have interpreted the provision as extending
protection to unmarried couples. 83
3. State Statutory Protection Against Housing Discrimination
There is a split in state court jurisprudence over the issue of protecting
unmarried couples against discrimination in housing.84 Twenty-one states
and the District of Columbia have state statutes specifically prohibiting
marital status discrimination in housing.85 However, states differ regarding
whether unmarried cohabitants fall within the definition of marital status. 86
Currently only Alaska, California, and Massachusetts have extended the
protection of marital status discrimination laws to unmarried couples
seeking to cohabit.87
82. See supra text accompanying notes 62-63.
83. See Barbara Endoy, Irreconcilable Cohabitation Statutes and Statutory Proscriptions
Against Marital Status Discrimination: McCready v. Hoffius and the Unworkable Status-Conduct
Disctinction, 44 WAYNE L. REV. 1809, 1821 (1999). The author provides an example of only
three state supreme courts that have held that marital status discrimination includes discrimination
against unmarried couples. Id. The three courts that have extended protection against marital
status discrimination to unmarried couples are the Alaska Supreme Court, the California Supreme
Court, and the Massachusetts Supreme Court. Id.
84. See, e.g., State by Cooper v. French, 460 N.W.2d 2, 6 (Minn. 1990) (holding that the
landlord's refusal to rent to an unmarried couple because they were unmarried was not a violation
of a state statute prohibiting marital status discrimination). But see, e.g., Swanner v. Anchorage
Equal Rights Comm'n, 874 P.2d 274, 278 (Alaska 1994) (holding that the landlord violated state
legislation prohibiting discrimination in housing on the basis of marital status when he refused to
rent to a couple only after learning that they were not married).
85. Keirsten G. Anderson, Protecting Unmarried Cohabitants from the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act, 31 VAL. U. L. REV. 1017, 1020 (1997) (naming states that have enacted legis-
lation prohibiting discrimination based on race, sex, national origin, or familial status in the sale or
rental of housing accommodations). The following states have enacted legislation that prohibits
marital status discrimination in housing: Alaska, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware,
Hawaii, Illinois, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, New Hampshire, New
Jersey, New York, North Dakota, Oregon, Rhode Island, Vermont, Washington, and Wisconsin.
Id. The District of Columbia has also enacted legislation that prohibits marital status
discrimination in housing. Id.
86. See supra text accompanying note 84.
87. See Swanner, 874 P.2d at 278 (finding that the landlord's policy of not renting to un-
married couples because unmarried cohabitation offended his religious beliefs constituted marital
status discrimination because the landlord would have rented to the unmarried couple if they had
been married); Atkisson v. Kern County Hous. Auth., 130 Cal. Rptr. 375, 381 (Cal. Ct. App.
1976) (finding that the housing authority's definition of family was too narrow, and therefore, an
unmarried couple who had been denied housing assistance had been discriminated against based
on their unmarried status); Worcester Hous. Auth. v. Mass. Comm'n Against Discrimination, 547
N.E.2d 43, 45 (Mass. 1989) (finding the denial of public housing benefits to an unmarried couple
was discrimination based on marital status).
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D. SPLIT IN JURISDICTIONS OVER A LANDLORD'S REFUSAL TO RENT
TO UNMARRIED COUPLES
Some jurisdictions have affirmatively answered the question of
whether a landlord is allowed to refuse to rent to an unmarried couple
because they intend to cohabit while others have answered it negatively. 88
The split in jurisdictions has occurred because courts have addressed the
issue from many different standpoints.89
1. Interpretation of Fair Housing Laws Prohibiting Marital
Status Discrimination and the Status/Conduct Distinction
Some state courts have made a distinction between a person's marital
status and his or her unmarried conduct when determining whether
unmarried couples should be protected against marital status discrimi-
nation. 90 For instance, in County of Dane v. Norman,91 the Wisconsin
Supreme Court made a distinction between what it considered "marital
status" and what it considered "conduct." 92 The court determined marital
status was "the state or condition of being married, the state or condition of
being single, and the like." 93 Conduct was defined to mean "personal
behavior; deportment; mode of action; [and] any positive or negative act." 94
In Norman, the landlord, Norman, did not discriminate against a speci-
fic marital status as he openly rented to married people, single people,
divorced people, and people who were widowed. 95 Norman did, however,
have a policy of not renting to groups of people who were unrelated. 96 His
88. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46(a)-64(c)(b)(2) (West. Supp. 1991) (indicating
that an anti-discriminatory housing provision was not to be interpreted as prohibiting a landlord
from refusing to rent an accommodation to a man and woman who were not related to each other
by either blood or marriage); see also French, 460 N.W.2d at 6 (holding that state fair housing
legislation did not prohibit a landlord from refusing to rent to an unmarried couple); McFadden v.
Elma Country Club, 613 P.2d 146, 148 (Wash. Ct. App. 1980) (holding that state fair housing
legislation did not prohibit a private country club from refusing to transfer title to real estate to an
unmarried woman who intended to cohabit on the property with her fianc6). But see, e.g.,
Foreman v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, 779 P.2d 1199, 1203 (Alaska 1989) (holding that
state fair housing legislation prohibited a landlord from refusing to rent an accommodation to an
unmarried couple).
89. See supra Part II.C.3 (demonstrating that courts differ in interpreting anti-discrimination
provisions).
90. See, e.g., French, 460 N.W.2d at 6.
91. 497 N.W.2d 714 (Wis. 1993).




96. Id. at 714.
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policy was challenged on the ground that it violated Dane County Ordi-
nance chapter 31, a fair housing provision prohibiting discrimination on the
grounds of marital status.97 The term "marital status" was defined in the
ordinance as including cohabitants. 98 Because the term "cohabitant" was
not defined in the ordinance, the court adopted a dictionary definition that
defined cohabitant in terms of an unmarried couple living together as
husband and wife.99
The Wisconsin Supreme Court rejected the argument that Norman's
policy of not renting to groups of unrelated individuals violated the Dane
County ordinance because a group of unrelated individuals did not fall
within the definition of cohabitants, and therefore, the group was not
afforded marital status.10 0 Choosing to live together with a group of
unrelated people was considered conduct.o The court held that Norman
was justified in refusing to rent to the prospective tenants because it was
their conduct of living together that he was opposed to and not their marital
status. 102
2. The Rejection of the Status/Conduct Distinction
Other courts have rejected the conduct as opposed to status distinc-
tion. 103 In Swanner v. Anchorage Equal Rights Commission,104 the Alaska
Supreme Court held that Swanner, a landlord, had discriminated against
three groups of unmarried tenants when he refused to rent them housing
accommodations after he learned of their intention to cohabit with people of
the opposite sex.105 Swanner's argument rested on a distinction between
status and conduct.106 Swanner proposed that it was not the status of the
prospective tenants that he had been opposed to because he willingly rented
apartments to people of all forms of marital status-single, married,
97. Id.
98. Id. at 715.
99. Id. at 716.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 717.
102. Id.
103. See Attorney Gen. v. Desilets, 636 N.E.2d 233, 235 (Mass. 1994) (rejecting the argu-
ment that the landlord had discriminated against the unmarried couple because of their conduct
instead of their marital status because it was actually the couple's unmarried status that made their
cohabitation offensive to the landlord's moral values); see also Swanner v. Anchorage Equal
Rights Comm'n, 874 P.2d 274, 278 (Alaska 1994) (rejecting the landlord's argument that he
refused to rent to an unmarried couple because he found their conduct of living together while
unmarried to be offensive to his religious beliefs because it was their unmarried status that made
their conduct offensive).
104. 874 P.2d 274 (Alaska 1994).
105. Swanner, 874 P.2d at 278.
106. Id. at 277.
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widowed, and divorced.107 Instead, he argued that he had refused to rent to
the prospective tenants because he was opposed to the type of conduct he
expected them to engage in, namely unmarried cohabitation. 108
The court rejected Swanner's argument. 09 It reasoned that because
Swanner denied the tenants housing only after finding out they were
unmarried, it was the unmarried status of the tenants that made their
conduct of cohabiting immoral to Swanner.110 Therefore, the Alaska
Supreme Court did not allow the landlord to make a distinction between the
unmarried couple's marital status and their conduct to justify his rejection
of their prospective tenancy.l' The court instead reasoned that the fact the
couple was unmarried was at the root of the landlord's disapproval of the
their conduct. 112
3. Interpretation of Fair Housing Laws Prohibiting Marital
Status Discrimination and the Existence of Unlawful
Cohabitation and Fornication Statutes
Other courts have looked to state statutes criminalizing fornication and
unmarried cohabitation when deciding whether to protect unmarried
cohabitants from discrimination.1 3 Courts in these jurisdictions have not
extended the protection of an anti-discrimination statute to unmarried
couples because unmarried cohabitation has been viewed as a form of
illegal conduct. 14
For example, in Mister v. A.R.K. Partnership,] 15 an unmarried couple
sued on the grounds that a landlord's policy of not renting to unmarried
couples violated an Illinois housing discrimination provision in the Illinois






113. See Mister v. A.R.K. P'ship, 553 N.E.2d 1152, 1157-59 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990) superceded
by statute as recognized in Jasniowski v. Rushing, 678 N.E.2d 743, 747 (Il1. App. 1997) (pro-
viding that the court took into consideration the existence of the Illinois statute criminalizing
fornication); see also State by Cooper v. French, 460 N.W.2d 2, 5-6 (Minn. 1990) (refusing to
interpret the term "marital status" as used in the Minnesota Human Rights Act as extending pro-
tection from marital status discrimination to unmarried couples because to do so would have been
inconsistent with the Minnesota fornication statute, which provided that when a single man and
woman have sexual intercourse they are guilty of fornication).
114. Mister, 553 N.E.2d at 1156-59; see also French, 460 N.W.2d at 4-6; County of Dane v.
Norman, 497 N.W.2d 714, 716 (Wis. 1993).
115. 553 N.E.2d 1152 (I11. App. Ct. 1990).
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Human Rights Act. 116 The Illinois Human Rights Act protected citizens
from discrimination on the basis of marital status.' 17
In deciding whether the legislature intended to protect unmarried
cohabitants under the anti-discrimination provision of the Illinois Human
Rights Act, the court took into consideration a state statute criminalizing
fornication and a statutory renouncement of common-law marriages. 18
The court acknowledged that amendments were made to the fornication
statute, whereby cohabitation was no longer a criminal offense.19
However, because the fornication statute was in effect at the time the anti-
discriminatory provision was enacted, the court reasoned that in order to
give effect to both statutes, it was only logical to conclude that the
legislature did not intend to extend the protections of the Illinois Human
Rights Act to unmarried cohabitants. 20 The court held that the Illinois
Act's prohibition on marital status discrimination did not extend to un-
married couples; therefore, it concluded that a landlord could refuse to rent
to a couple because they were unmarried. 121
4. Interpretation of Fair Housing Laws Prohibiting Marital
Status Discrimination by Application of the Plain Meaning
of the Statute
Other courts have taken their state statutes at face value when
determining whether unmarried cohabitants should be protected against
marital status discrimination.122 In Foreman v. Anchorage Human Rights
Commission,123 the Alaska Supreme Court interpreted anti-discrimination
provisions in a municipal code and in a state statute regarding unlawful
116. Mister, 533 N.E.2d at 1153.
117. See 775 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/1-103 (2001) (stating that the Act protects against dis-
crimination on the basis of "race, color, religion, sex, national origin, ancestry, age, marital status,
[and] physical or mental handicap").
118. Mister, 553 N.E.2d at 1157.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 1157-59.
121. Id. at 1159.
122. See Swanner v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, 874 P.2d 274, 278 (Alaska 1994)
(reasoning that the plain language of the Anchorage Municipal Code showed that marital status
included cohabiting couples); see also Foreman v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, 779 P.2d
1199, 1201-02 (Alaska 1989) (stating that the court looked at the plain language of the Alaska
statute and reviewed the intent behind the anti-discrimination law); Smith v. Fair Employment &
Hous. Comm'n, 913 P.2d 909, 914-15 (Cal. 1996) (reasoning that to determine what a statute
means, the first place to look is the words of the statute, and those words must be given their
ordinary and plain meaning); Attorney Gen. v. Desilets, 636 N.E.2d 233, 234-35 (Mass. 1994)
(holding that landlords, by refusing to rent to an unmarried couple, violated the anti-discrimination
provision of Massachusetts law, which prohibited discrimination in housing on the basis of marital
status).
123. 779 P.2d 1199 (Alaska 1989).
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practices in the sale or rental of property to determine whether a landlord
could refuse to rent to an unmarried couple. 24 In pertinent part, the
Anchorage Municipal Code provided that it was unlawful for a person to
refuse to rent, sell, or lease property because of marital status.1 25 The
statute further provided that it was unlawful for a person to discriminate
based on marital status. 126 The Alaska statute made it unlawful for a person
with rights to sell, lease, or rent property to discriminate against a person
because of marital status.127 The court interpreted the state statute and the
municipal ordinance using the ordinary and common meaning of the words
and concluded that both provisions clearly prohibited discrimination based
on marital status.128
In analyzing the words of both pieces of legislation, the Alaska
Supreme Court determined that an unmarried couple was to be afforded the
benefits of the anti-discrimination provisions because the term prohibiting
discrimination against a "person" was defined to include "more than one
person" in both provisions. 129 Further support for the decision to protect
124. Foreman, 779 P.2d at 1201.
125. Id. (citing Anchorage Municipal Code, AMC 05.20.020 (1993)). The Anchorage code
stated that:
[Ilt is unlawful for the owner, lessor, manager, agent or other person having the right
to sell, lease, rent or advertise real property:
(A) To refuse to sell, lease or rent the real property to a person because of race,
religion, age, sex, color, national origin, marital status or physical handicap;
(B) To discriminate against a person because of race, religion, age, sex, color,
national origin, marital status or physical handicap in a term, condition or
privilege relating to the use, sale, lease or rental of real property.
Id. at 1201 n.2.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 1202; see also ALASKA STAT. § 18.80.240 (Michie 2000). The Alaska statute
stated:
It is unlawful for the owner, lessee, manager, or other person having the right to sell,
lease, or rent real property
(1) to refuse to sell, lease, or rent the real property to a person because of sex,
marital status, changes in marital status, pregnancy, race, religion, physical or
mental disability, color, or national origin; however, nothing in this paragraph
prohibits the sale, lease, or rental of classes of real property commonly known as
housing for "singles" or "married couples" only;
(2) to discriminate against a person because of sex, marital status, changes in marital
status, pregnancy, race, religion, physical or mental disability, color, or national
origin in a term, condition, or privilege relating to the use, sale, lease, or rental of
real property; however, nothing in this paragraph prohibits the sale, lease, or
rental of classes of real property commonly known as housing for "singles" or
"married couples" only.
Id.
128. Foreman, 779 P.2d at 1201-02.
129. Id.; see also ALASKA STAT. § 18.80.240 (stating that the term "person" as defined in
Alaska statute section 18.300 includes "one or more individuals").
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unmarried couples from discrimination was found in the municipal code's
definition of marital status, which specifically included treating people
differently because they were either married or unmarried.130 The Alaska
Supreme Court held that the protection against marital status discrimination
found in the state statute and the Anchorage Municipal Code protected the
rights of unmarried couples.131
5. Interpretation of Fair Housing Laws Prohibiting Marital
Status Discrimination and Consideration of State Public
Policy Promoting the Institution of Marriage
A final factor that some courts have taken into consideration when
deciding whether to protect unmarried couples from discrimination is the
public policy of the state regarding unmarried cohabitation. For instance, in
Norman, the Wisconsin Supreme Court struck down a county ordinance
that protected unmarried cohabitants from marital status discrimination
because it conflicted with Wisconsin public policy, which promoted the
stability of marriage and family.132 Dane County ordinance section 31.02
prohibited unlawful discrimination in housing.133 The ordinance specified
that it was unlawful for a person to discriminate upon the basis of marital
status regarding the rental of property. 134 Included within the definition of
marital status were people who were cohabiting.135
The court determined that the county ordinance was invalid because it
violated the general public policy of the state of Wisconsin. 136 Therefore,
as Wisconsin public policy dictated, unmarried cohabitants were not
afforded protection against a landlord who discriminated on the basis of
their status as unmarried cohabitants.137
As the above discussion on state anti-discrimination law indicates,
many states afford their citizens the right to be protected against marital
status discrimination when seeking housing accommodations. 38 It is also
clear that not all states have extended these protections to unmarried
130. Foreman, 779 P.2d at 1202 n.5.
131. Id. at 1203.
132. County of Dane v. Norman, 497 N.W.2d 714, 716 (Wis. 1993).
133. See id. at 715 (citing section 31.02 of the Dane County ordinance, which stated that the
intent of the ordinance was to end discrimination in housing).
134. Id. (citing section 31.02 of the Dane County ordinance).
135. Id. (citing section 31.03(5) of the Dane County ordinance).
136. Id. at 716.
137. Id. The Supreme Court of Wisconsin rejected the ordinance because the municipality
did not have the power or authority to pass legislation that was contrary to state laws or
"repugnant to the general policy of the state." Id.
138. See supra text accompanying note 85.
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cohabitants who have suffered discrimination at the hands of landlords who
have refused to rent to couples because of their unmarried status. 139 The
current protection offered against marital status discrimination for North
Dakota residents is codified in the Housing Discrimination Chapter of the
North Dakota Century Code.140 Section 14-02.5-02 of the North Dakota
Century Code specifies that there is no provision in the Housing
Discrimination chapter that prevents a landlord from refusing to rent to a
couple that is unmarried, unrelated, and of the opposite sex. 141 Therefore, it
is now clear in North Dakota that anti-discriminatory provisions are not
extended to unmarried couples who have been denied the ability to rent
housing by a landlord because they are unmarried.142
139. See, e.g., State by Cooper v. French, 460 N.W.2d 2, 7 (Minn. 1990) (holding that state
fair housing legislation did not prohibit a landlord from refusing to rent to an unmarried couple);
McFadden v. Elma Country Club, 613 P.2d at 146, 148 (Wash. App. Ct. 1980) (holding that state
fair housing legislation did not prohibit a private country club from refusing to transfer title to real
estate to an unmarried woman who intended to cohabit on the property with her fianc6).
140. N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 14-02.5-02 & 14-02.5-07 (Supp. 2001).
1. A person may not refuse to sell or rent, after the making of a bona fide offer,
refuse to negotiate for the sale or rental of, or in any other manner make
unavailable or deny a dwelling to an individual because of race, color, religion,
sex, disability, age, familial status, national origin, or status with respect to
marriage or public assistance.
2. A person may not discriminate against an individual in the terms, conditions, or
privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling or in providing services or facilities in
connection with a sale or rental of a dwelling because of race, color, religion,
sex, disability, age, familial status, national origin, or status with respect to
marriage or public assistance.
4. Nothing in this chapter prevents a person from refusing to rent a dwelling to two
unrelated individuals of opposite gender who are not married to each other.
N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.5-02.
A person whose business includes engaging in residential real estate-related
transactions may not discriminate against an individual in making a real estate-related
transaction available or in the terms or conditions of a real estate-related transaction
because of race, color, religion, sex, disability, age, familial status, national origin, or
status with respect to marriage or public assistance. A residential real estate-related
transaction is the selling, brokering, or appraising of residential real property or the
making or purchasing of loans or the provision of other financial assistance to
purchase, construct, improve, repair, maintain a dwelling, or to secure residential real
estate. Nothing in this section prohibits a person engaged in the business of furnishing
appraisals of real property to take into consideration factors other than race, color,
religion, sex, disability, age, familial status, national origin, or status with respect to
marriage.
N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.5-07.
141. N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.5-02(4).
142. See id. (providing that a landlord's decision not to rent to an unmarried, opposite sex
couple is not discrimination because nothing in the housing discrimination chapter of the North
Dakota Century Code prevents a landlord from refusing to rent on that basis).
2002] CASE COMMENT
E. THE NORTH DAKOTA HUMAN RIGHTS ACT
Before the North Dakota Legislature enacted the North Dakota Human
Rights Act in 1983, there was no established public policy prohibiting
housing discrimination in North Dakota.1 43 With the enactment of the
Human Rights Act, attention was brought to the prevention of discrimi-
nation in housing, and remedies were designed to further vindicate a
person's right to be free of discrimination.144 In implementing this policy,
the legislature was able to specify a vast number of grounds upon which a
person engaged in the sale or rental of property could not discriminate
against another person.145 Under the North Dakota Human Rights Act, a
person could not discriminate based upon race, color, religion, sex, national
origin, public assistance, or status with respect to marriage when making a
decision regarding whether to rent accommodations to a prospective
tenant. 146 These protections remained part of the Human Rights Act until
the North Dakota Legislature repealed the discriminatory housing
provisions in 1999 and 2001 and enacted the Discriminatory Housing
Practices Act. 147
143. N.D. Fair Hous. Council, Inc. v. Haider, No. AI-98-077, 1999 WL 33283355, at *4
(D.N.D. Mar. 9, 1999).
144. Moses v. Burleigh County, 438 N.W.2d 186, 188-90 & n.1 (N.D. 1989).
145. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.5-02.
146. N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.4-12 (1997) (repealed 1999). The North Dakota Century
Code stated that:
It is a discriminatory practice for an owner of rights to housing or real property.., to:
(1) Refuse to transfer an interest in real property or housing accommodation to a per-
son because of race, color, religion, sex, national origin, age, physical or mental
disability, or status with respect to marriage or public assistance;
(2) Discriminate against a person in the terms, conditions, or privileges of the
transfer of an interest in real property or housing accommodation because of
race, color, religion, sex, national origin, age, physical or mental disability, or
status with respect to marriage or public assistance; or
(3) Indicate or publicize that the transfer of an interest in real property or housing
accommodation by persons is unwelcome, objectionable, not acceptable, or not
solicited because of a particular race, color, religion, sex, national origin, age,
physical or mental disability, or status with respect to marriage or public
assistance.
Id.
147. Id. Discriminatory Housing Practices by Owner or Agent, section 14-02.4-12, was
repealed by the North Dakota Legislature by S.L. 1999, ch. 134, § 4. Section 14-02.4-12.1,
Discriminatory Housing Practices, was subsequently repealed by the North Dakota Legislature by
S.L. 2001, ch. 145, § 14.
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F. APPARENT CONFLICT BETWEEN NORTH DAKOTA'S UNLAWFUL
COHABITATION STATUTE AND THE NORTH DAKOTA HUMAN
RIGHTS ACT
The North Dakota unlawful cohabitation statute provides that "a person
is guilty of a class B misdemeanor if he or she lives openly and notoriously
with a person of the opposite sex as a married couple without being married
to the other person." 48 The North Dakota Human Rights Act, as it
appeared when the Petersons refused to rent the duplex unit to the Kippens
in 1999, stated that it was a discriminatory practice for an owner of rights to
housing or real property to refuse to transfer an interest in real property or
housing accommodations to a person because of status with respect to
marriage. 149
A cursory reading of the two statutes could lead to the conclusion that
they conflicted with each other. 50 On one hand, the unlawful cohabitation
statute made it illegal for two unmarried persons to live together as a
married couple would.' 5' But on the other hand, the North Dakota Human
Rights Act dictated that a landowner could not refuse to rent housing
accommodations to people because of their marital status.152 The apparent
conflict between these two statutes had been addressed and resolved on
prior occasions by both the North Dakota Attorney General'53 and the
United States District Court for the District of North Dakota. 154
1. The North Dakota Attorney General's 1990 Opinion
Addressing the Conflict Between the Two Statutes
In 1990, the North Dakota Attorney General considered whether it was
an unlawful discriminatory practice under the provisions of the North
Dakota Human Rights Act to refuse to rent accommodations to unmarried
persons of the opposite sex who intended to cohabit.55 The attorney
general stated that it was not unlawful discrimination under the North
Dakota Human Rights Act for a landlord to refuse to rent to an unmarried
148. N.D. CENT. CODE§ 12.1-20-10 (1997).
149. N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.4-12 (repealed 1999).
150. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-20-10 (classifying unmarried cohabitation as a criminal
offense); see also N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.4-12 (repealed 1999) (prohibiting a landlord from
discriminating against a person based on marital status).
151. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-20-10.
152. N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.4-12 (repealed 1999).
153. 1990 N.D. Op. Att'y Gen. No. 12, 43.
154. N.D. Fair Hous. Council, Inc. v. Haider, No. A1-98-77, 1999 WL 33283355, at *4
(D.N.D. Mar. 9, 1999).
155. 1990 N.D. Op. Att'y Gen. No. 12, 43.
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couple who intended to live together. 156 In formulating his opinion, the
attorney general looked to McFadden v. Elma Country Club,157 a Washing-
ton case involving a statute prohibiting cohabitation and one prohibiting
discrimination based on marital status. 158
In McFadden, the Washington appellate court held that the Elma
Country Club could refuse to grant a membership into the Elma Country
Club community because Ms. McFadden intended to cohabit, even though
there was a statute that prohibited discrimination on the basis of marital
status.159 The Washington appellate court based its reasoning on the fact
that the cohabitation statute had not been repealed when the anti-discrimina-
tion statute was enacted.160 Therefore, the court concluded that unmarried
cohabitants were not protected under the anti-discrimination statute. 161
The North Dakota Attorney General found the reasoning applied by the
Washington appellate court to be persuasive. 62 In resolving the conflict
between the two North Dakota statutes, the attorney general similarly
reasoned that the unlawful cohabitation statute had not been repealed by the
legislature at the time the Human Rights Act was enacted in 1983.163
Therefore, the attorney general concluded that the legislature did not intend
"marital status discrimination to include discrimination on the basis of a
couple's unwed cohabitation." 164
Also, North Dakota statutory rules governing conflicting statutes
dictate that a particular provision of a statute controls over a general
provision of a statute.165 The attorney general determined that the unlawful
cohabitation statute must be held to control as it prohibited a particular
activity.166 The North Dakota Human Rights Act, as a general provision,
was left in a subservient position because its prohibitions covered several
different bases for discrimination. 167 By applying the terms of the unlawful
cohabitation statute to the issue, the attorney general concluded that under
156. Id.
157. 613 P.2d 146 (Wash. Ct. App 1980).
158. 1990 N.D. Op. Att'y Gen. No. 12, 44; McFadden, 613 P.2d at 149 n.2.
159. McFadden, 613 P.2d at 152.
160. Id. at 150.
161. Id.
162. 1990 N.D. Op. Att'y Gen. No. 12, 44.
163. Id. (citing McFadden, 613 P.2d at 150).
164. Id. (quoting McFadden, 613 P.2d at 150).
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the Human Rights Act, it was not an unlawful discriminatory offense to
refuse to rent housing to an unmarried couple intending to cohabit. 168
2. United States District Court Decision in North Dakota
In North Dakota Fair Housing Council, Inc. v. Haider,169 the United
States District Court for the District of North Dakota considered whether
unmarried cohabitants were offered protection from housing discrimination
on the basis of marital status under the North Dakota Human Rights Act. 170
The landlord, Haider, argued that he did not want to rent to the unmarried
plaintiffs because he did not want to assist them in violating the
cohabitation statute and potentially expose himself to criminal liability for
aiding in the commission of a crime. 171 The unmarried plaintiff couple
argued that the unlawful cohabitation statute was never meant to punish
unmarried, opposite sex couples, but that it was enacted to punish
unmarried couples who hold themselves out to be married for unlawful
purposes. 172
The district court looked to the 1990 opinion of the North Dakota
Attorney General 73 and regarded it as being "highly persuasive" and con-
sistent with the court's own analysis of the issue. 74 Of particular impor-
tance to the Haider court was the fact that the unlawful cohabitation statute
was not repealed when the Human Rights Act was enacted, nor was it
repealed when the Human Rights Act was amended a few years later.175
The court concluded that the statutes could be harmonized so that the
cohabitation statute effectively removed unmarried cohabitants from being
protected against housing discrimination under the North Dakota Human
Rights Act. 176 The court, therefore, dismissed the plaintiffs' claim with
prejudice. 177
In 1999, the North Dakota Legislature began making changes to the
housing discrimination provisions in the North Dakota Human Rights
Act.178 The legislature repealed the discriminatory housing provisions
of the Human Rights Act and created a new act entitled Housing
168. Id. at 45.
169. No. A1-98-77, 1999 WL 33283355 (D.N.D. Mar. 9, 1999).
170. Haider, 1999 WL 33283355, at *1.
171. Id. at *3.
172. Id.
173. See supra Part I.F.1.
174. Haider, 1999 WL 33283355, at *4.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id. at *5.
178. N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.4-12 (1997) (repealed 1999).
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Discrimination.179 A final piece of legislation enacted in 2001 resolved
whether it is a discriminatory practice for a landlord to refuse to rent to an
unmarried couple because they are unmarried. 80
G. THE NORTH DAKOTA DISCRIMINATORY HOUSING PRACTICES ACT
In 1999, the North Dakota Legislature enacted the Discriminatory
Housing Practice Act.81 Two provisions were created to prohibit discrimi-
nation in residential real estate.18 2 The first provision addressed discrimina-
tory practices by a landowner in the sale or rental of property.183 In 1999,
the statute provided that
[a] person may not refuse to sell or rent, after the making of a bona
fide offer, refuse to negotiate for the sale or rental of, or in any
other manner make unavailable or deny a dwelling to an individual
because of race, color, religion, sex, disability, age, familial status,
national origin, or status with respect to marriage or public
assistance. 184
179. N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 14-02.5-01 to -45 (Supp. 2001).
180. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.5-02 (providing "nothing in this chapter prevents a per-
son from refusing to rent a dwelling to two unrelated individuals of opposite gender who are not
married to each other").
181. H.R. 1043, 56th Leg. 649-62 (N.D. 1999). House Bill 1043, the Discriminatory Hous-
ing Practices Act, provided an in-state mechanism for enforcement of federal and state fair hous-
ing complaints and created a fair housing law that is substantially equivalent to the Federal Fair
Housing Act. Testimony before the House Judiciary Committee by Amy Schauer Nelson, Execu-
tive Director of the North Dakota Fair Housing Council (Jan. 12, 1999). At the time the legis-
lature was considering enacting House Bill 1043, the only redress a person had under the North
Dakota Human Rights Act was to file a claim in state court. Id. The changes in housing discrimi-
nation law made North Dakota law substantially equivalent to anti-discrimination provisions in
the Federal Fair Housing Act. Id. The North Dakota Legislature created the Discriminatory
Housing Practices Act so that the state would be in substantial compliance with federal law in
order to partake in federal discrimination programs and so that the state would be provided with
assistance in investigating and bringing discrimination actions. See House Standing Committee
Minutes Bill/Resolution No. 1043, 1999 Leg., 56th Sess. I (N.D. 1999) (explanation of Vonette
Richter, Legislative Council on House Bill 1043); see also Testimony on HB 1043 by Mark
Bachmeir, Interim Commissioner at the Department of Labor prepared for the House Judiciary
Committee (explaining that House Bill 1043 attempts to establish an in-state regulatory authority
and administrative process for receiving and investigating charges of housing discrimination under
state law). The Bill also provided for state enforcement of federal fair housing law as long as the
provisions are substantially equivalent to those in the Federal Fair Housing Act. House Standing
Committee Minutes Bill/Resolution No. 1043, 1999 Leg., 56th Sess. I (N.D. 1999).
182. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.5-02 (relating to the sale or rental of property); see also
N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.5-07 (relating to residential real estate-related transactions).
183. N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.4-12 (1997) (repealed 1999).
184. N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.5-02 (emphasis added). Under the prior housing discrimina-
tion law of the North Dakota Human Rights Act, an aggrieved party could only seek remedies
through the court system. North Dakota Department of Labor-Division of Human Rights, Under-
standing Housing Discrimination Laws in North Dakota, available at http://www.state.nd.us/labor
(last visited May 30, 2002). Under the Housing Discrimination Act, North Dakota citizens can
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW [VOL. 78:539
The second provision addressed discrimination in residential real
estate-related transactions. 185 According to the statute, a person involved in
real estate-related transactions could not discriminate against a person
because of race, religion, color, sex, national origin, age, familial status, or
status with respect to marriage when making the transaction available or in
making the terms of the transaction.
18 6
In 2001, the North Dakota Legislature created a new subsection to the
sale or rental provision of the Housing Discrimination Chapter. 187 This new
section was entitled Unmarried Couple Property Rental Act.188 The Act
was created to clarify the conflicting provisions in North Dakota's housing
discrimination chapter and its unlawful cohabitation statute. 189 The new
provision provided that "nothing in [the housing discrimination chapter]
prevents a person from refusing to rent a dwelling to two unrelated
individuals of opposite gender who are not married to each other."190 Since
August 1, 2001, a landlord in North Dakota can refuse to rent to an un-
married couple because they are of the opposite sex and are not married.191
H. CASES WHERE A LANDLORD REFUSED TO RENT TO AN
UNMARRIED COHABITING COUPLE BECAUSE OF RELIGIOUS
BELIEFS
When landlords refuse to rent to unmarried couples seeking to cohabit,
it is often because unmarried cohabitation is against the landlords' religious
beliefs.192 The issue then raised is whether landlords' religious beliefs
voice their complaints of unlawful housing discrimination to the Department of Labor for investi-
gation. Id. Citizens also have the option of filing claims with the Federal Department of Housing
and Urban Development. Id.
185. N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.5-07 (Supp. 2001).
186. Id.
187. See H.R. 1448, 2001 Leg., 57th Sess. 114 (N.D. 2001) (providing for the creation and
enactment of a new subsection to North Dakota Century Code section 14-02.5-02 relating to rental
property for unmarried people).
188. N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.5-02; see also Human Services Committee: Testimony on HB
1448, 57th Sess. 213 (N.D. 2001) (prepared by Representative Jim Kasper) (stating House Bill
1448, Unmarried Couple Property Rental, was introduced at the request of a constituent who was
aware of what happened to the Petersons when they refused to rent to an unmarried man (Robert
Kippen) and woman (Patricia Kippen (DePoe)).
189. See HOUSE STANDING COMMITrEE MINUTES, H.B. 1448, 57th Sess. 213 (N.D. 2001)
(providing testimony by Representative Jim Kasper).
190. N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.5-02.
191. Id.
192. See State by Cooper v. French, 460 N.W.2d 2, 3-4 (Minn. 1990) (involving a landlord
who refused to rent an apartment to an unmarried couple because he believed that "an unmarried
couple living together or having sexual relations outside of marriage [was] sinful"); see also
Attorney Gen. v. Desilets, 636 N.E.2d 233, 234-35 (Mass. 1994) (concerning landlords who had a
policy of not renting to unmarried couples because the couples' conduct would be in violation of
strictly held religious beliefs).
CASE COMMENT
justify denying housing to unmarried couples in spite of statutes that ex-
plicitly outlaw marital status discrimination in housing.193 Some landlords
have raised constitutional challenges to anti-discrimination laws prohibiting
them from refusing to rent to unmarried couples because the landlords
argue the laws infringe upon their right to free exercise of religion.194 The
court must then consider whether the fair housing law, prohibiting marital
status discrimination, infringes upon fundamental religious rights protected
under the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. 195
Free exercise jurisprudence has been labeled one of the most "chaotic
and unpredictable [areas] of the law."'196 In North Dakota, the legislature
avoided burdening the courts with chaotic and unpredictable Free Exercise
Clause cases by passing an amendment to the Housing Discriminatory
Practices Act in 2001 that allows a landlord to refuse to rent to unmarried
couples. 197
III. ANALYSIS
Peterson was decided by a four-justice majority, which held that re-
fusing to rent an accommodation to unmarried people unlawfully seeking to
cohabit was not unlawful discrimination under the North Dakota Human
Rights Act.19 8 Justice Sandstrom wrote the majority opinion; he was joined
by Chief Justice VandeWalle, Justice Neumann, and Justice Maring.199
Justice Kapsner dissented.200 She argued that the district court erred by
granting summary judgment because there was not adequate evidence that
193. See McCready v. Hoffius, 586 N.W.2d 723, 728 (Mich. App. 1998) (discussing the
landlord's argument that the anti-discrimination law provided for in the Civil Rights Act, pro-
hibiting discrimination on the basis of status, violated religious freedoms protected by the
Michigan Constitution and the United States Constitution); see also Desilets, 636 N.E.2d at 235
(noting a landlord's allegation that forcing him to comply with a statutory mandate prohibiting
discrimination in housing rentals, violated his right to freely exercise his religion); Swanner v.
Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, 874 P.2d 274, 279 (Alaska 1994) (concerning the landlord's
assertion that enforcement of the anti-discrimination provision of section 05.20.020 of the
Anchorage Municipal Code had the effect of violating his rights to free exercise of religion
because the statute forced him to conduct his business as a landlord in a way that contradicted his
religious beliefs).
194. Swanner, 874 P.2d. at 276-77; Smith v. Fair Employment & Hous. Comm'n, 913 P.2d
909, 912 (Cal. 1996); McCready, 586 N.W.2d. at 725; French, 460 N.W.2d at 3-4.
195. U.S. CONST. amend I. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof." Id.
196. Maureen E. Markey, The Landlord/Tenant Free Exercise Conflict in a Post-RFRA
World, 29 RUTGERS L.J. 487, 553 (1998).
197. N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.5-02(4) (Supp. 2001).
198. N.D. Fair Hous. Council, Inc. v. Peterson, 2001 ND 81, 9 49-52, 625 N.W.2d 551,
563-64.
199. Id. 9J% 1, 52, 625 N.W.2d at 553, 564.
200. Id. 9 53, 625 N.W.2d at 564 (Kapsner, J., dissenting).
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the Kippens' conduct violated the unlawful cohabitation statute. 20' She also
determined that the trial court erred by dismissing the Housing Council
according to Rule 12202 and Rule 17203 of the North Dakota Rules of Civil
Procedure. 204
A. THE MAJORITY OPINION
The North Dakota Supreme Court determined that the unlawful cohabi-
tation statute and the North Dakota Human Rights Act could be harmonized
by recognizing that the cohabitation statute regulated conduct, not status.
205
The court held that it was not unlawful to deny housing to an unmarried
couple seeking to openly and notoriously live together as husband and wife
because unmarried cohabitation was a crime in North Dakota.206
The court began its analysis from a historical standpoint, examining the
text of the unlawful cohabitation statute and the North Dakota Human
Rights Act.207 The court looked to the legislative history of the cohabitation
statute and noted that cohabitation had been prohibited in North Dakota
since before 1890, and that the initial codification of cohabitation as a crime
remained relatively unchanged until 1973.208 The court then acknowledged
that in 1971 an interim legislative committee considered whether to include
201. Id.
202. Rule 12(c) of the North Dakota Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
Motion for judgment on the pleadings. After the pleadings are closed but within such
time as not to delay the trial, any party may move for summary judgment of the plead-
ings. If, on a motion for judgment on the pleadings, matters outside the pleadings are
presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall be treated as one for
summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56, and all parties shall be
given reasonable opportunity to present all material made pertinent to such a motion
by Rule 56.
N.D. R. Civ. P. 12(c).
203. Rule 17(a) of the North Dakota Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
Real party in interest. Every action must be presented in the name of the real party in
interest. An executor, administrator, guardian, bailee, trustee of an express trust, a
party for whom or in whose name a contract has been made for the benefit of another,
or a party authorized by statute may sue in that person's own name without joining the
party for whose benefit the action is brought; and if a statute so provides an action for
the use or benefit of another must be brought in the name of the State of North Dakota.
No action may be dismissed on the ground that it is not prosecuted in the name of the
real party in interest until a reasonable time has been allowed after the objection for
ratification of commencement of the action by, or joinder or substitution of, the real
party in interest; and the ratification, joinder, or substitution has the same effect as if
the action had been commenced in the name of the real party in interest.
N.D. R. CIv. P 17(a).
204. N.D. Fair Hous. Council, Inc. v. Peterson, 2001 ND 81, 53, 625 N.W.2d 551, 564.
205. Id. 9 38, 625 N.W.2d at 562.
206. Id.
207. Id. 9 7-8, 625 N.W.2d at 554-55.
208. Id. 1 10, 625 N.W.2d at 555.
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a recommendation to repeal the cohabitation statute within the proposed
changes to the sexual offense chapter of the North Dakota Criminal
Code.209 The committee did not recommend repealing the statute, but
adopted a proposed bill, which classified unlawful cohabitation as a class B
misdemeanor. 210  The court found it significant that the unlawful
cohabitation statute had not been repealed by the legislature. 211
The court also examined the legislative history of the North Dakota
Human Rights Act, which showed that no reference had been made to the
cohabitation law while passing the Act. 212 The legislature's failure to
recognize the pre-existing cohabitation statute was not interpreted by the
court to mean that the legislature had intended to repeal the cohabitation
statute by implication because in North Dakota there is a presumption
against repeal of a statute by implication. 213 Instead, the court reasoned that
it would not consider the cohabitation statute as being repealed without
finding that the terms of the cohabitation statute and the North Dakota
Human Rights Act were completely inconsistent.214 The court reasoned it
was required to attempt to harmonize the provisions of the two statutes to
determine whether they were so inconsistent that both could not co-exist. 215
The court acknowledged that a 1991 bill introduced to the North
Dakota House of Representatives recommended that the unlawful cohabita-
tion statute be repealed. 216 An overwhelming majority of the members of
the House of Representatives rejected repealing the statute, and the bill was
defeated. 217 Rejection of the measure to repeal the cohabitation statute by
the legislature eight years after enacting the Human Rights Act provided the
court with further evidence that the legislature did not intend to repeal the
209. Id. I 11.
210. See id. 1 12, 625 N.W.2d at 556 (stating that the new criminal code was approved by
the legislature in 1973); see also Hearing on S.B. 2049 Before the Senate Judiciary Comm., 43d
Sess. 12 (N.D. 1973) (labeling the unlawful cohabitation statute as section 12.1-20-10 and
proposing that the crime be classified as a class B misdemeanor); N.D. CENT. CODE §12.1-20-10
(1997) (including the exact proposal made by the 1971 interim committee in the third alternative).
211. N.D. Fair Hous. Council, Inc. v. Peterson, 2001 ND 81, 44, 625 N.W.2d 551, 563.
212. Id. T 13, 625 N.W.2d at 556.
213. Id. T9 34-36, 625 N.W.2d at 561.
214. Id. T 34.
215. Id. ' 36; see also N.D. CENT. CODE § 1-02-07 (1987 & Supp. 2001) (regarding rules for
statutory interpretation). The rule instructs that when there is a conflict between a specific provi-
sion in a statute and a general provision in the same or in another statute, both statutes must be
interpreted in a way that gives effect to both provisions. N.D. CENT. CODE § 1-02-07. Therefore,
a preliminary attempt must be made to harmonize conflicting statutes before it can be determined
that the statutes are irreconcilable. Peterson, 36, 625 N.W.2d at 561-62.
216. Peterson, 1 15, 625 N.W.2d at 557.
217. See id. (noting the proposed repeal of the cohabitation statute was rejected by seventy-
eight members of the House of Representatives while only twenty-eight members voted in favor
of it).
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cohabitation statute when it enacted the Human Rights Act in 1983.218 The
continuing existence of the unlawful cohabitation statute after the
enactment of the North Dakota Human Rights Act "[vitiated] any argument
that the legislature intended 'marital status' discrimination to include
discrimination on the basis of a couple's unwed cohabitation." 219
The court concluded its historical overview by examining the decision
in Haider.220 Specifically, the court noted that the district court found the
conflict between the cohabitation statute and the North Dakota Human
Rights Act was not irreconcilable. 221 Therefore, the court realized that the
statutes could be harmonized so that effect could be given to both
provisions. 222
The North Dakota Supreme Court noted that the Haider court placed
particular emphasis on the fact that .the cohabitation statute was not repealed
when the North Dakota Fair Housing Act was enacted, nor was it repealed
when the attorney general's opinion was issued in 1990.223 According to
the Haider court, the term "status with respect to marriage" in the North
Dakota Human Rights Act did not lose meaning when interpreted as not
including unmarried people who cohabit.224 The Human Rights Act still
protected against several bases of housing discrimination, but it would not
extend to protect the rights of unmarried couples intending to cohabit.
225
Finally, the North Dakota Supreme Court acknowledged that by applying
North Dakota rules of statutory interpretation, the federal court had
218. Id. 9 13-15, 625 N.W.2d 551, 556-57. The North Dakota Supreme Court recognized
that in 1991 a measure to repeal the cohabitation statute failed. Id. 15. The cohabitation statute
was therefore still valid law in 1991, eight years after the enactment of the North Dakota Human
Rights Act in 1983. Id. When the North Dakota Supreme Court acknowledged the 1990 North
Dakota Attorney General's opinion, it also looked to the reasoning applied by the Washington
appellate court in McFadden v. Elma Country Club, which was cited to by the attorney general.
Id. 14. The North Dakota Supreme Court noted that in McFadden, the Washington Appellate
Court held that Elma Country Club was allowed to refuse to rent to an unmarried couple regard-
less of the existence of a statute prohibiting discrimination on the basis of marital status. Id. The
North Dakota Supreme Court recognized that the Washington appellate court had reached its con-
clusion by reasoning that the unlawful cohabitation statute was not repealed when the unlawful
discrimination statute was enacted. Id. Therefore, the North Dakota Supreme Court realized that
the Washington appellate court concluded that the legislature did not intend to include unmarried
couples within the protection offered against marital status discrimination. Id.
219. Id. (quoting McFadden v. Elma Country Club, 613 P.2d 146, 150 (Wash. Ct. App
1980)).
220. Id. ( 9 46-48, 625 N.W. 2d at 563; N.D. Fair Hous. Council, Inc. v. Haider, No. A 1-98-
77, 1999 WL 33283355, at *3 (D.N.D. Mar. 9, 1999).
221. Peterson, 47, 625 N.W.2d at 563.
222. Id. (9 47-48 (citing N.D. CENT. CODE § 1-02-07 (1987 & Supp. 2001)).
223. Id. 19 46-48.




determined that the two statutes could be reconciled. 226 The North Dakota
Supreme Court found the federal court decision to be both persuasive and
"entitled to respect." 227
Continuing with its analysis, the court subsequently discussed the
meaning of both statutes and looked to their plain meaning to find the
legislature's intent.228 Because the wording of the cohabitation statute was
clear and unambiguous, the court concluded the legislature had intended the
crime of cohabitation to be committed when an unmarried couple lives
openly and notoriously as a married couple.
229
The court then looked to interpret the term "status with respect to
marriage" as it appeared in the North Dakota Human Rights Act.230 The
court needed to define what the term meant because it had not been defined
by the legislature when the statute was enacted. 231 The court rejected the
simple argument made by the plaintiffs, which proposed that the only
necessary inquiry was whether a person was married. 232 Instead, the court
reasoned that when considering the term "status with respect to marriage,"
an inquiry would be necessary to determine whether a person was divorced,
widowed, or separated.233 The court acknowledged that courts in other
states have interpreted terms similar to "status with respect to marriage."
234
Some courts have interpreted the term broadly, meaning that protection was
offered to anyone subjected to a policy that used marital status
226. Peterson, 47, 625 N.W.2d at 563 (stating that the federal court harmonized the
statutes by recognizing that the unlawful cohabitation statute could be applied to unmarried people
intending to cohabit, maintaining a prohibition on cohabitation while still allowing the North
Dakota Fair Housing Act to protect against discrimination based on marital status).
227. Id. 48.
228. Id. T 23, 625 N.W.2d at 559.
229. See id. 9 24, 625 N.W.2d at 560 (providing that when a statute is clear and unam-
biguous, the court will not read any other meaning into the statute other than what appears on its
face because legislative intent is presumed to be clear from the text of the statute itself). When
statutes are revised there is a presumption that the legislature did not intend to change the spirit of
the law unless there is a clear legislative intent to make such a change. Id. at 559-60. Therefore,
because no changes are read into the cohabitation statute, an unmarried couple is guilty of cohabi-
tation when they live together openly and notoriously as husband and wife while they are not
married. Id. 91 20, 625 N.W.2d at 559.




234. Id. 91 30, 625 N.W.2d at 560-61. These courts have disagreed regarding the term's defi-
nition. See State by Cooper v. French, 460 N.W.2d 2, 6 (Minn. 1990) (explaining that the Minne-
sota Supreme Court decided that unmarried cohabitation was a form of conduct and not a "marital
status," thereby reserving a permissible ground for a landlord to refuse to rent to an unmarried
couple). But see Swanner v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, 874 P.2d 274, 278 (Alaska 1994)
(explaining that the Alaska Supreme Court considered unmarried cohabitation a form of marital
status, and a landlord who refused to rent to a couple only after finding out that they were not
married had discriminated against their marital status).
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classifications. 35 Other courts have interpreted the term narrowly so that a
landlord was only found guilty of marital status discrimination when the
refusal to rent a housing accommodation was based completely on the
status of a prospective tenant as single, married, divorced, separated, or
widowed.236
Marital status, however, was not the ground upon which the Kippens
had been refused accommodations. 237 Because common-law marriage is
not valid in North Dakota, the Kippens did not collectively have a marital
status.238 At the time they were refused housing, Robert Kippen and
Patricia Kippen (DePoe) individually held the marital status of single. 239
Their single statuses were not the grounds upon which the Petersons refused
to rent to them. 240 The unmarried couple was refused accommodations
because they were unmarried and were seeking to cohabit together as if they
were married. 24' The North Dakota Supreme Court concluded that this was
a permissible ground for the Petersons to refuse to rent to the Kippens. 242
The court reasoned that the cohabitation statute was directed at regu-
lating conduct and not status. 243 The criminal cohabitation statute therefore
prohibits the conduct of two unmarried people living together openly and
notoriously as husband and wife.244 The cohabitation statute would have
been rendered meaningless and would not have been given full effect if the
235. See John C. Beattie, Prohibiting Marital Status Discrimination: A Proposal for the Pro-
tection of Unmarried Couples, 42 HASTINGS L.J. 1415, 1422 (1991). The author states that courts
that adopt a broad view of marital status discrimination offer protection against policies that use
marital status classifications. Id. These courts extend protection to marital status discrimination
even if the discriminatory policy in issue affects only a portion of people subject to the policy. Id.
For example, the author cites to Atkisson v. Kern County Housing Authority, 130 Cal. Rptr. 375
(Cal. Ct. App. 1976), where a California appellate court held that a county housing authority
policy, which prohibited low income housing tenants from living with a member of the opposite
sex who was not related by blood, marriage, or adoption, constituted illegal discrimination on the
basis of marital status. Atkisson, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 380.
236. See Beattie, supra note 235, at 1419-20 (stating that under the "narrow view" of marital
status discrimination, courts find unlawful marital status discrimination only when a person is
treated differently on the sole basis of his or her status as single, married, divorced, separated, or
widowed). These courts will reject a policy based on marital status only if the policy has the
effect of disadvantaging every person within a marital status classification. Id.
237. N.D. Fair Hous. Council, Inc. v. Peterson, 2001 ND 81, 29, 625 N.W.2d 551, 560.
238. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-03-01 (1997) (providing only marriages entered into
according to law are valid); see also Pearson v. Pearson, 2000 ND 20, 8, 606 N.W.2d 128, 131
(stating a common-law marriage cannot be entered into in North Dakota).
239. Peterson, 9 29, 625 N.W.2d at 560.
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. Id. 1 49, 625 N.W.2d at 563.
243. Id. ( 37,625 N.W.2d at 562.
244. Id. T 38.
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court had decided that the human rights statute regulated status. 245 After
interpreting the North Dakota Human Rights Act and the unlawful co-
habitation statute, the court concluded the following: in North Dakota it is
unlawful for an unmarried couple to live together in an open and notorious
manner as husband and wife. 246 It is also unlawful for a landlord to dis-
criminate against a person on the basis of his or her marital status, namely
whether he or she is married, single, divorced, widowed, or separated. 247
However, according to the court, it is not unlawful for an unmarried couple
to be denied housing accommodations when seeking to cohabit together as
husband and wife in an open and notorious fashion.248
In accordance with the North Dakota rules of statutory interpretation,
the court interpreted the statutes in a way that gave effect to each.249 The
court also interpreted the statutes in order to effectuate their purposes.250
For example, the court took into consideration that the North Dakota
Human Rights Act was enacted by the North Dakota Legislature for the
purpose of preventing and deterring discrimination, and that the unlawful
cohabitation statute was enacted as a criminal statute to vindicate public
norms and to put the public on notice of the cohabitation crime and its
corresponding punishments. 251 The court gave effect to the North Dakota
Human Rights Act by interpreting the statue as prohibiting a landlord from
discriminating against a person on the basis of his or her marital status. 252
The court gave effect to the criminal cohabitation statute by recognizing
that North Dakota public policy disfavors unmarried cohabitation, and






249. Id. 91 32, 625 N.W.2d at 561; see also N.D. CENT. CODE § 1-02-07 (1987 & Supp.
2001) (providing: "Whenever a general provision in a statute is in conflict with a special provision
on the same or in another statute, the two must be construed, if possible, so that effect may be
given to both provisions").
250. N.D. Fair Hous. Council, Inc. v. Peterson, 2001 ND 81, 33, 625 N.W.2d 551, 561.
251. Id.
252. See id. 16, 625 N.W.2d at 558 (stating that the statutes could be construed to give
effect to both provisions). The purpose of the North Dakota Human Rights Act is to prohibit
discrimination and to deter people who are involved in discriminatory behavior. Id. 33, 625
N.W.2d at 561. Effect is given to the North Dakota Human Rights Act, even when the unlawful
cohabitation statute is applied to exclude unmarried cohabitants from protection, because the term
"status with respect to marriage" contained in the Act will still regulate against several
discriminatory housing practices based on status with respect to marriage. Id. 16, 625 N.W.2d
at 558.
253. Id. T 38-39, 625 N.W.2d at 562.
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The court reasoned that without an explicit intent to repeal the cohabi-
tation statute, it had to attempt to harmonize the two statutes.2 54 The court
declined to be persuaded by the plaintiffs' argument proposing that the
Human Rights Act was to govern the issue.2 55 Giving greater deference to
the North Dakota Human Rights Act would indicate that the court gave a
new meaning to the cohabitation statute or that the court had repealed the
cohabitation statute.2 56 The court also was not persuaded by the plaintiffs'
argument that the legislature intended to repeal the cohabitation statute by
adopting the North Dakota Human Rights Act.257 The court subsequently
rejected the plaintiffs' proposition that the North Dakota Human Rights Act
be given greater deference than the cohabitation statute.2 58
The court looked to the North Dakota Attorney General's opinion
issued in 1990, which addressed the conflict between the unlawful cohabi-
tation statute and the North Dakota Human Rights Act.259 The court
acknowledged that although it was not bound by the attorney general's
opinion, it found the opinion persuasive because it addressed the specific
legal question at hand and was supported in subsequent legislative action. 260
The court was also persuaded by the fact that the legislature demonstrated
its approval of the attorney general's opinion because the opinion had not
received negative treatment from the legislature since it was published in
1990.261
Specifically, the North Dakota Supreme Court observed that the North
Dakota Attorney General paid attention to the fact that the unlawful cohabi-
tation statute had not been repealed when the North Dakota Human Rights
Act was enacted.262 Also, the court recognized that the attorney general
harmonized the statutes by applying the specific terms of the cohabitation
254. Id. 1 36, 625 N.W.2d at 561-62.
255. See id. f 35, 625 N.W.2d at 561. The court declined to accept the plaintiffs' suggestion
that the terms of the North Dakota Human Rights Act be applied, reasoning that an attempt must





259. Id. 40, 625 N.W.2d at 562.
260. See id. 41 (reasoning that the opinion was especially persuasive because it had
included legislative information about the two statutes and it specifically addressed the conflict
between the cohabitation statute and the North Dakota Human Rights Act).
261. See id. 43 (stating that the legislature impliedly approved the attorney general's 1990
opinion because in the five biennial sessions of the legislature since the opinion, there had only
been one proposal made suggesting repeal of the cohabitation statute, House Bill 1403, and it was
rejected).
262. Id. 44, 625 N.W.2d at 563.
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statute to the issue. 263 Finally, the court noted that the attorney general
concluded that it was not unlawful discrimination to refuse to rent to an
unmarried cohabiting couple under the provision of the North Dakota
Human Rights Act. 264
In summary, the court considered the terms of the Human Rights Act
and the unlawful cohabitation statute, the rules of statutory construction,
and the legislative history of both provisions to decide whether it was a
violation of the North Dakota Human Rights Act when a landlord refused to
rent to an unmarried couple because the couple was seeking to cohabit.265
In doing so, the court concluded that "it is not an unlawful discriminatory
practice under [the North Dakota Human Rights Act for a landlord] to
refuse to rent to unmarried persons seeking to cohabit."266
B. JUSTICE KAPSNER'S DISSENT
Justice Kapsner dissented for two reasons.2 67 First, she argued the
district court erred by granting summary judgment against the Kippens, and
second, she argued the district court erred by dismissing the Housing
Council for lack of standing and for not being a real party in interest. 268
Justice Kapsner argued that the district court erred by granting
summary judgment against the Kippens because there was not enough
evidence to conclude that their conduct violated the cohabitation statute. 269
Because the majority decided that the cohabitation statute was directed
towards regulating conduct, sufficient evidence that the Kippens' conduct
violated the cohabitation statute was needed to support the granting of
summary judgment. 270 The only evidence the district court had was an
admission by Robert Kippen to Mary Peterson that he intended to live
together with his fianc6.271 No further admissions were made to Mary
Peterson that Robert Kippen intended to violate all of the elements of the
263. Id.; see also 1990 N.D. Op. Att'y Gen. No. 12, 44. The attorney general then
recognized that the cohabitation statute regulated one specific activity, unmarried cohabitation,
whereas the North Dakota Human Rights Act regulated several bases for discrimination. 1990
N.D. Op. Att'y Gen. No. 12, 44. Therefore, the attorney general reasoned that because the co-
habitation statute contained a particular provision, the conflict between the two statutes was
resolved by applying the terms of the cohabitation statute. Id.
264. N.D. Fair Hous. Council, Inc. v. Peterson, 2001 ND 81, 14, 625 N.W.2d 551, 556-57.
265. Id. 8-50, 625 N.W.2d at 555-64.
266. Id. 9 49, 625 N.W.2d at 563.
267. Id. 53, 625 N.W.2d at 564 (Kapsner, J., dissenting).
268. Id. Justice Kapsner argued that the district court erred in applying Rule 12 of the North
Dakota Rules of Civil Procedure to dismiss the Housing Council for lack of standing. Id.
269. Id. T 54, 625 N.W.2d at 564.
270. Id.
271. Id. 58, 625 N.W.2d at 565.
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cohabitation statute. 272 From this sole admission, the district court and
Mary Peterson presumed that the Kippens would engage in unlawful con-
duct.
27 3
Justice Kapsner argued that this evidence was insufficient to conclude
that the Kippens could have been prosecuted for unlawful cohabitation in
violation of North Dakota Century Code section 12.1-20-10.274 Justice
Kapsner reasoned that the court erred when it took this paltry amount of
evidence to presume that the Kippens were unlawfully cohabiting in
violation of the unlawful cohabitation statute. 275 The district court did not
have evidence that the Kippens would live openly and notoriously in the
community or evidence that they would be living as a married couple.276
Justice Kapsner therefore argued that granting summary judgment was
inappropriate because there were questions of material fact regarding
whether the Kippens would actually have been living in violation of the
cohabitation statute. 277 Justice Kapsner concluded that because summary
judgment is only an appropriate method of deciding a matter when there are
no genuine issues of material fact, the district court's decision to award
summary judgment was erroneous and should have been reversed. 278
Justice Kapsner further contended that the district court erred in apply-
ing Rule 12 of the North Dakota Rules of Civil Procedure to dismiss the
Housing Council from the case for lack of standing.279 In its complaint, the
272. Id. 59-61, 625 N.W.2d at 566.
273. Id. 9 58, 625 N.W.2d at 565. Interestingly, Justice Kapsner indicated that Mary
Peterson had violated former North Dakota Century Code section 14-02.4-12, the North Dakota
Human Rights Act, when she presumed that the Kippens would be engaging in unlawful conduct
based on their marital status as unmarried because her presumption discriminated based on status
with respect to marriage. Id. 9 54, 625 N.W.2d at 564.
274. Id. 9 58, 625 N.W.2d at 565; see also N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-20-10 (1997).
275. N.D. Fair Hous. Council, Inc. v. Peterson, 2001 ND 81, 9J 59-63, 625 N.W.2d 551,
565-67. The court based its decision to grant summary judgment upon finding that there was no
issue of material fact regarding whether the Kippens were seeking to unlawfully cohabit. Id. f 60,
625 N.W.2d at 566. The court based its reasoning on the presumption that the Kippens intended
to unlawfully cohabit, which was based only on evidence that they were unmarried and that they
indicated an intent to live together. Id.
276. Id. 91 61. The district court defined the element of "living together as a married couple"
to include "mutual assumption of [] marital rights, duties and obligations [] usually manifested by
married people, including but not necessarily dependent on sexual relations." Id. (quoting Baker
v. Baker, 1997 ND 135, 13, 566 N.W.2d 806, 811).
277. Id. 9 62, 625 N.W.2d. at 566-67; see also Prod. Credit Ass'n of Minot v. Klein, 385
N.W.2d 485, 487 (N.D. 1986) (providing a court should grant summary judgment only if, after
viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the party against whom summary judgment is
sought, there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law).
278. Peterson, 62, 625 N.W.2d at 566-67.
279. Id. 1 63, 625 N.W.2d at 567. In order to have standing, a party must show that it has
suffered some threatened or actual injury, which was a result of the illegal action. Id. T 65, 625
N.W.2d at 568. The party cannot be asserting a generalized injury; it must be asserting its own
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Housing Council alleged that it had suffered economic injuries while in-
vestigating the Petersons' alleged discriminatory housing practices. 280 The
Housing Council also alleged that it had suffered by not being able to carry
out its purpose of eliminating other facets of housing discrimination while it
was involved in vindicating the Kippens' right to equal housing.281 Based
on these allegations, Justice Kapsner reasoned that the Housing Council had
alleged a personal stake in the case and that it had also suffered specific
injuries that were sufficient to satisfy the requirements for standing. 282
Justice Kapsner then argued that the district court further erred in
applying Rule 17 of the North Dakota Rules of Civil Procedure to conclude
that the Housing Council was not a real party in interest. 283 Justice Kapsner
fights and interests, and its claim cannot be sustained through the rights and interests belonging to
third parties. Id. When these requirements are satisfied, it is accepted that the party has alleged a
personal stake in the outcome of the controversy, and the court should determine its position in the
dispute. Id.
280. Id. 1 64, 625 N.W.2d at 567. The Housing Council alleged that it had suffered econo-
mic injuries because it had to hire extra investigators to pursue the Kippens' discrimination claim.
Id.
281. Id. The Housing Council alleged that the strain on financial resources led to further
injury because it deprived the Housing Council from pursuing other efforts to carry out its purpose
of combating unlawful housing discrimination. Id.
282. Id. 1 76, 625 N.W.2d at 572. Justice Kapsner also analogized the pleadings of the
North Dakota Fair Housing Council to those of another housing council in Havens Realty Corp. v.
Coleman, 455 U.S. 363 (1982). Id. 9 70, 625 N.W.2d at 569-70. In Havens, the Housing Council
alleged that it was required to expend significant resources to identify and counteract racially
discriminatory practices. Havens, 455 U.S. at 379. The Court reversed a prior decision to dismiss
because the organization had alleged economic injuries that it suffered while pursuing an in-
vestigation of racial steering in a housing discrimination action. Id. Justice Kapsner further noted
that a majority of the circuits had looked to Havens and concluded that a fair housing organization
could recover financial losses incurred in the pursuit of prohibiting discrimination. Peterson,
70, 625 N.W.2d at 569-70 (citing Cent. Ala. Fair Hous. Ctr., Inc. v. Lowder Realty Co., 236 F.3d
629, 640 (11 th Cir. 2000)).
Justice Kapsner argued there was a difference between granting a motion to dismiss under
Rule 12 and granting a motion to dismiss under a summary judgment motion. Id. 73, 625
N.W.2d at 571. As articulated by the United States Supreme Court, during the pleading stage, a
party can establish standing through general factual allegations of injury because on a motion to
dismiss there is a presumption that the facts asserting the alleged injury consist of those facts
necessary to support the claim. Id. (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561
(1992)). However, for a summary judgment motion, a "mere allegation" is not sufficient to sus-
tain the party's interest in the action; the party must present "specific facts" which will be under-
stood as true for purposes of the summary judgment motion. Id. 73, 625 N.W.2d at 571.
Because the proceedings had not reached the summary judgment stage when the district court dis-
missed the Housing Council for lack of standing, Justice Kapsner argued that the Housing Council
had alleged actual injury in its complaint and had presented enough factual allegations to survive a
Rule 12 motion to dismiss. Id. 1 75. Justice Kapsner, therefore, concluded that because the
Housing Council had alleged actual injuries and those injuries were of a specific nature, the
district court erred by dismissing the North Dakota Fair Housing Council for lack of standing
under Rule 12 of the North Dakota Rules of Civil Procedure. Id. 77, 625 N.W.2d at 572.
283. Peterson, 77, 625 N.W.2d at 572; see also N.D. R. CIV. P. 17(a) (stating that "[elvery
action must be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest"). A party is determined to be a
real party in interest when it has a "real, actual, material, or substantial interest in the subject of
the action." Id. (citing Froling v. Farrar, 44 N.W.2d 763, 765 (N.D. 1950)).
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reasoned that the Housing Council was a real party in interest because the
alleged discrimination claim against the Petersons caused the organization
to expend resources, which had been allocated towards educational and
outreach pursuits, investigating the allegation. 284 Justice Kapsner found the
Housing Council was a real party in interest because it was pursuing
recovery for its own claims stemming from the direct injury it had suffered
as an organization. 285
In summary, Justice Kapsner dissented because she disagreed with the
district court's decision to grant summary judgment against the Kippens
and to dismiss the Housing Council from the action. 286 According to
Justice Kapsner, the district court was too hasty in deciding that summary
judgment was an appropriate method to dismiss the Kippens' case.287
Because of the negligible amount of evidence used by the district court to
grant summary judgment, Justice Kapsner argued that questions of material
fact existed to make the application of summary judgment erroneous. 288
The second portion of Justice Kapsner's dissent was based on procedural
issues. 289 She argued that the district court erred by dismissing the North
Dakota Fair Housing Council on two counts: first, for lack of standing, and
second, for not being a real party in interest.290 For these reasons, Justice
Kapsner dissented and declared that the summary judgment should have
been reversed in favor of the Kippens and the dismissal of the Housing
Council should have been remanded for further proceedings. 291
IV. IMPACT
The percentage of people cohabiting in the United States has been
increasing exponentially since the 1970s. 292 According to the 2000 United
States Census Report, the number of cohabiting couple households has
increased by seventy-two percent in the past decade. 293 Interestingly, North
284. Peterson, 78, 625 N.W.2d at 572.
285. Id.
286. Id. 9 53, 625 N.W.2d at 564.
287. Id. 1 62, 625 N.W.2d at 566.
288. Id. 1 59, 625 N.W.2d at 565-66.
289. See id. 9 63-75, 625 N:W.2d at 567-72 (explaining the argument that the district court
erred in its application of Rule 12 and Rule 17 of the North Dakota Rules of Civil Procedure).
290. Id. 1 63-73, 625 N.W.2d at 567-71.
291. Id. 79, 625 N.W.2d at 572.
292. See National Fatherhood Initiative, Cohabitation Trends, available at http://www.
leaderu.com/fatherfacts/cohabitation.html (last visited May 30, 2002) (citing the U.S. Census
Bureau, Statistical Abstract of the United States: 1997 Census, finding that "the number of people
who cohabit grew from 523,000 in 1970 to 3.96 million in 1996, an increase of over 600%").
293. See Alternatives to Marriage Project, Alternative to Marriage Update: The Census
Issue! June 2001, available at http://www.unmarried.org/june0l.html (last visited May 30, 2002)
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Dakota was one of the states that reported the greatest increase in the
number of cohabiting households between 1990 and 2000.294 However,
cohabitation is still unlawful in North Dakota, and there is no indication that
the legislature is going to repeal the unlawful cohabitation statute.295
Because the new legislation regulating property rental to unmarried
couples only became effective on August 1, 2001, the impact it will have on
North Dakota is not yet known.296 It has been suggested that it will affect
couples both young and old who want to live together but do not want to get
married. 297 The new law that allows landlords to refuse to rent to
unmarried, opposite sex couples could also result in an economic strain on
those who live together for financial reasons, 298 and it could stymie the
interest an unmarried couple has in receiving equal access to housing. 299
(referring to the 2000 U.S. Census, which demonstrated an increase in cohabiting couples since
the 1990 Census).
294. See id. (stating that between 1990 and 2000, the number of unmarried partner
households in North Dakota increased by 113. 1%, which made it one of the states with the largest
increase in percentage of unmarried partner households).
295. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-20-10 (1997).
296. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.5-02 (Supp. 2001) (providing the 2001 amendment
regarding unmarried couple property rental became effective August 1, 2001).
297. E-mail from Amy Schauer Nelson, Executive Director, North Dakota Fair Housing
Council, to Erin Zasada, student, University of North Dakota School of Law (Sept. 21, 2001) (on
file with author). Amy Schauer Nelson stated:
In rental housing, you tend to see younger couples renting prior to being able to afford
their first home. They do not want to be forced into marriage. However, this does not
just affect the younger generation, older couples also make the decision to live
together outside of marriage rather than lose a social security check.
Id.
298. See id. (indicating that some couples cohabit because of financial reasons); see also
Explanations for Cohabiting available at http://members.aol.concohabiting/expl.htm (last visited
May 20, 2002) (providing reasons why couples cohabit). Economics is the second most common
reason people give for living together:
(1) It is cheaper for two to live together than one; "why pay for two apartments when
we can share one?" or (2) "it isn't penalized by welfare (meaning: TANF [Temporary
Assistance to Needy Families] grants [which have replaced AFDC])-in fact, it's
encouraged, so why not?" (3) Many senior citizens cohabit because of tax disin-
centives to marry and for inheritance reasons. (4) Some twenty-one million married
working couples pay an extra $1,400 in federal income taxes on average, for being
married compared to couples who have the same income, but cohabit rather than mar-
ry. A single person pays a 15% tax on income up to $25,350. So a cohabiting couple
can earn up to $50,000 and remain in the 15% bracket. But a married couple is in the
15% bracket only if their combined income is under $42,350. They must pay a 28%
tax on all earnings about that amount. Also, the standard deduction of a single person
is $4,250, but a joint return can claim only $7,100, rather than double the $4,250, or
$8,500 (5) Marriage is a major financial outlay that many people can not afford.
Id.
299. See Smith v. Fair Employment & Hous. Comm'n, 913 P.2d 909, 925 (Cal. 1996).
When a landlord is permitted to discriminate against an unmarried couple by refusing to rent
housing to them, there is the potential that this discrimination will lead to a more expensive
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What is known, however, is that by enacting North Dakota Century
Code section 14-02.5-02, the legislature has resolved the conflict between
the provisions in the North Dakota Century Code relating to housing dis-
crimination with respect to marital status and the North Dakota unlawful
cohabitation statute.300 The recent amendments to the Housing Discrimi-
nation Act and the precedent created by the North Dakota Supreme Court's
decision in Peterson explicitly allow North Dakota landlords to close the
door in the face of unmarried cohabitants solely because they are unrelated,
of the opposite sex, and plan to live together. 301
At present, it is still illegal in North Dakota for an unmarried and
unrelated man and woman to live together as if they are married. 302
However, the North Dakota Legislature still considers debate over repealing
the unlawful cohabitation statute even though there has been no indication
that the law will be repealed.303 As legislation changes to adapt to society's
changing morals and attitudes, only time will tell whether the cohabitation
trend that has been observed in this state will motivate the legislature to
repeal the cohabitation law. 304
V. CONCLUSION
In North Dakota Fair Housing Council, Inc. v. Peterson, the North
Dakota Supreme Court held that it was not a discriminatory practice for a
landlord to refuse to rent an accommodation to an unmarried, opposite sex
housing market. Id. at 928. Furthermore, allowing landlords to discriminate on the basis of
marital status frustrates a tenant's interest in obtaining equal access to housing. Id.
300. See SENATE INDUSTRY, BUSINESS AND LABOR COMMITTEE, SENATE STANDING COM-
MITTEE MINUTES, H.B 1448, 57th Sess. at I (N.D. 2001) (providing Representative Jim Kasper's
statement that Bill 1448 will clarify the potential conflict between the North Dakota Century Code
provisions relating to housing discrimination with respect to marital status and the unlawful
cohabitation statute).
301. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.5-02(4) (Supp. 2001).
302. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-20-10 (1997).
303. See REPORT OF THE NORTH DAKOTA LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL 2001, at 157-63. The
2001 Report of the North Dakota Legislative Council contained a study on sexual offender
statutes. Id. The unlawful cohabitation statute was included in one of the areas reviewed by the
committee. Id. The committee received testimony in favor of decriminalizing the cohabitation
statute. Id. It was suggested that there is no need for a statute that makes it a crime for adults of
any age to live together. Id. The testimony further indicated that the unlawful cohabitation statute
was outdated and should be repealed. Id. Although the committee did not make a
recommendation to repeal the unlawful cohabitation statute at the time, it was considered. Id.
304. See Lawrence C. Nolan, Legal Strangers and the Duty of Support: Beyond the Biologi-
cal Tie-But How Far Beyond the Marital Tie?, 41 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1, 35-36 (2000)
(proposing that society has accepted cohabitation because the number of people cohabiting has
increased dramatically and cohabitation has become commonplace). The author asserts that the
demographics of cohabitation support the view that cohabitation laws should change to promote
the general welfare of the citizens living in the state. Id.
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couple who intended to cohabit.305 This decision was based on analysis that
focused upon historical reasons to support the existence of the unlawful
cohabitation statute in relation to the North Dakota Human Rights Act.
306
Erin P. B. Zasada*
305. N.D. Fair Hous. Council, Inc. v. Peterson, 2001 N.D. 81, 49, 625 N.W.2d 551, 563.
306. See generally id. 9-49, 625 N.W.2d at 555-63 (demonstrating the court's analytical
framework).
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